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# LOGIC AND LANGUAGE

GORDON H. CLARK

In contrast with the Greek philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, in contrast also with the earlier modern systems of Spinoza and Hegel, the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries have seen the development of avowedly irrationalistic viewpoints. Nietzsche, Dewey, Heidegger, and Sartre are examples. The themes of this contemporary irrationalism have been applied to the problem of religion and have infiltrated even moderately conservative Christian thought.

Admittedly, Christian history in other centuries too has produced certain anti-intellectualistic strains of pietism, mysticism, and stubborn obscurantism. Logic has been called "cold," and "human" reason inadequate. The syllogisms of Aristotle are pagan, or else they are dry bones devoid of living flesh. At the present time these sentiments receive added support from the peculiarly modern investigations of language and semantics and are presented to us in a new dress. For purposes of exposition, analysis, and criticism, articles from recent issues of *The Christian Scholar* and the *Gordon Review* are here selected.

*The Christian Scholar* is published by the Commission on Christian Higher Education of the National Council of Churches. In the issue of September 1955, Geddes MacGregor has an article entitled "The Nature of Religious Utterance," and John A. Hutchinson writes on "The Religious Use of Language." Their common point of view rather than any differences they may manifest is the present subject of study.

MacGregor opens with Croce's assertion that "all language is metaphorical, or none is;" and soon follows with Urban's rejection of literalism and his conclusion as to "the inevitably metaphorical and symbolic character of all language." MacGregor does not wish to be held to the position of Croce and Urban altogether, but he seems to accept the thesis that all *religious* language is metaphorical or symbolic. If this be so, religious utterances must be evaluated in a very different manner from the usual analysis of logical propositions.

In support of his position, MacGregor gives some examples of the use of language; and it will be our duty to determine whether or not these admitted cases require his conclusions. First, he refers to a college choir whose Jewish, Unitarian, and Quaker members, majoring in political science or anthropology, were singing a Medieval hymn. Few if any of them understood the concepts of the hymn, and yet their words communicated the con-

cepts to those persons in the audience who had the proper understanding. Similarly, a child does not understand marriage when he reads the last sentence of a fairy tale.

These examples, particularly the second, are supposed to militate against a literal understanding of language because not even all adults have the same understanding of marriage. This word has "levels" of meaning, and some words have many levels, others fewer. There is no literal meaning. However, it does not seem to me that MacGregor's examples prove what he intended. Granted, neither the child nor some adults know all the propositions that may be truly asserted of marriage as an institution. Some adults do not know all the propositions or theorems that may be truly asserted of a triangle. But the ignorance of these theorems does not entail an ignorance of the definition of triangle or marriage; much less does it prove that there is no literal meaning whatever to these words.

Another illustration MacGregor gives is that of a very ordinary preacher preaching a very ordinary sermon. But the sermon or a sentence of it becomes a vital message to someone in the congregation. The person is converted and his life is changed. Once again the words conveyed more meaning than the speaker intended, and hence, argues MacGregor, the meaning could not be literal. But why not? Could not the literal meaning of a sentence or two recall themes that had lain dormant in the hearer's mind? Could not even the literal meaning itself point out a new way of life? How can such an instance be made to show that all religious language is metaphorical or symbolic?

Finally, MacGregor asserts that the theological proposition "God is omniscient" is never as satisfactory as the liturgical statement, "O my God, who knowest all things." For MacGregor religious utterance "is always in the second person singular." Of course, the third person sentence and the second person phrase, given here, are not precisely equivalent. But the differences do not derive from the person of the verb. If MacGregor had written the first sentence as "My God is omniscient," he would have had a third person sentence which is the exact equivalent of a second person phrase. It may not be a "satisfactory" mode of address, for it is not a mode of address at all; but this is not to say that it is not entirely satisfactory for a creedal statement. Whatever may be the difference between second and third person verbs, it is not at all clear why second person verbs must be metaphorical rather than literal.

The Hutchinson article in the same periodical develops the theory somewhat more clearly and more profoundly. The thesis is that "religion in all its range and variety consists of symbols." Where MacGregor hes-

itated, Hutchinson says expressly that "all language is metaphorical . . . Every common noun is a kind of dead metaphor. But religious terms of words are metaphorical in a further and distinctive sense." That Jesus Christ is sitting at the right hand of God the Father Almighty and that the Lord is my shepherd are examples of analogy or metaphor. MacGregor at least hints that the Virgin Birth is also a metaphor. To support his view, Hutchinson sketches a religious epistemology which is based on images—a sort of mental idolatry—and which is assimilated to art and mythology. God always (note the always) speaks to man through images, and "religious experience is a process of being hit by such images."

There is not space to analyze this unacceptable epistemology; but I would like to say that while Hutchinson may be describing his own religious experience, he is not describing mine. His sweeping generalization is simply not true to fact.

One objection, however, Hutchinson feels obliged to answer. If myth is unavoidable in religion, some explanation is required as to the choice of myths. One person chooses Greek mythology, another Christian mythology. Doubtless such choices are often made unreflectively; but Hutchinson thinks that it is possible to make a rational choice of myths. The basis for such a rational choice is the adequacy of the myth to explain the facts of existence as we confront them in daily life and action.

Before proceeding to the defense of an opposing view of religion and language, I wish to offer a preliminary criticism of Hutchinson and then to outline the views of a third exponent of non-literal language and non-Aristotelian logic.

It seems to me that Hutchinson fails rationally to justify a choice among myths. If myths were literal truths, one might be more adequate than another. The Greek myth of Zeus' method of producing rain might be considered more adequate, or less adequate, than the myth about the windows of heaven, attributed to the Hebrews. But if these stories are both mythological and symbolic, simply symbolic of the literal fact that it rains, it is hard to judge what adequacy might require. A literal statement from Aristophanes' *Clouds* might explain, but a myth explains nothing. Furthermore, if the language is symbolic, it seems clear that one symbol, before historic events have fixed its meaning, is as good as another. Today the swastika symbolizes National Socialism, and the hammer and sickle, Communism; but at the start there was no reason why the communists could not have chosen the swastika and Hitler the hammer and sickle. To push this preliminary criticism one step further, we might ask the question, What is a religious symbol the symbol of? The cross no doubt is the symbol of

Christ's crucifixion; but when the crucifixion is mentioned, most people understand it literally. Now, if all language is symbolic, it would be necessary to express the meaning of a symbol by another symbol, and this by still another. How can this regress be of any value unless sometime, and the sooner the better, we come upon a symbol that symbolizes a non-symbolic meaning?

The third article with the same general viewpoint, "Language and Theology," by Richard K. Curtis was published in the *Gordon Review* of September, 1955. The phenomena to which this article appeals are somewhat different from the preceding, and the scope of the whole is considerably wider. Curtis follows John Dewey in substituting the know-how of craftsmen and slaves for the know-why of Aristotle. He gives what appears to be a mechanistic theory of sensation. He ventures the judgment that Indo-European grammar emphasizes free-will, while the grammar of the Eskimos is fatalistic. With these matters I do not propose to deal. Nor am I concerned with the Aristotelian metaphysics that he believes with some plausibility to be inherent in Aristotelian logic. It is specifically the logic and the language on which attention is to be centered.

Language, for Curtis, at least literal, Aristotelian language, is a verbalization that is substituted for experiential knowledge. It is an unnatural way of thinking by which propositions must be severely strained to include everyday answers to questions. Curtis then gives certain instances, such as, all tomatoes are vegetables, all the works of Poe are magnificent, and all Socialists are Communists. The point of these examples is difficult to make out. Perhaps the three assertions are false; but the falsity of several particular sentences does not disqualify judgments of the *all a is b* type; nor would they prove that propositions must be severely strained in order to talk of botany, literature, or politics. The law of identity, *a* is *a*, and the principle of disjunction also fall under Curtis' condemnation. For a reason he does not state, he objects to the assertion, If I am an historian, I either follow F. J. Turner or I do not. But apparently his conscience pricks him a little, for he admits that it is legitimate to say, Either I am a Christian or I am not. But by what principle can he reject disjunction in history and retain it in religion? If disjunction or excluded middle is a fallacious form of thought, it can never be used legitimately; but if it is legitimate in one case, all the misapplications of slovenly thinkers will not serve to invalidate its proper universality. Toward the end of his article Curtis again repudiates the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle by making the somewhat vague assertion that they "have less and less meaning in an increasingly scientifically oriented society."

Declamation without argument and the enumeration of alleged misapplications do not refute Aristotle. To defend Aristotelian logic and literal language I wish to reproduce one part of Aristotle's argument. Only after the opponent has clearly indicated where and how this argument breaks down, has he any right to discard the laws in question. Neither Curtis, Hutchinson, nor MacGregor faces the challenge squarely.

Aristotle begins by asking his opponent to make any assertion he chooses. Perhaps he will say that three is an odd number or that Socrates is a man, or even that a religious term is symbolic. Whatever the assertion may be, it is always in the form of *a is b*. Now, may I ask the authors of these three articles, is this a mistake? Can they make any assertion whatever without using, perhaps disguising, but veritably using the form *a is b*? Since all of the assertions in their articles have this form, they have not yet demonstrated the possibility of avoiding it. Aristotle then continues: when a person says that *a is b*, he does not mean that *a is not b*. By saying *is* instead of *is not*, the opponent himself is using the laws in question. But in case this is too easy a dismissal of the opponent, let some attention be paid to the predicate term.

Suppose then that the opponent has said, three is odd, Socrates is a man, or *a is b*. Aristotle wishes to show that the predicate term, odd, man, or *b*, has a single, definite meaning. Of course, words in any language bear several connotations or meanings (called levels by MacGregor), and this ambiguity frequently produces blunders in the application of logical principles. This ambiguity is also the probable cause of most of the opposition to traditional logic. But the fact that a word has several meanings does not damage Aristotle's contention, unless the meanings be infinite in number. If the word *man* has ten different meanings, a separate term can be invented for each; and then each term would have a single meaning. If, however, the term *man* had an infinite number of meanings, it would mean nothing in particular, and the assertion, Socrates is a man, would mean nothing. In other words, language, conversation, and argument would be impossible. For if a word is to convey a meaning, it must not only mean something; it must also not mean something. If it had an infinite number of meanings, if the term *man* had the meanings of all the words in the dictionary, it would be useless in speech. In fine, if *man* means not-man, the sentence, Socrates is a man, means nothing. But those who deny the law of contradiction identify *man* and not-man. Those who deny the law of excluded middle assert that Socrates is neither man nor not-man. What they say is nonsense. Nothing sensible can be said without using the laws they deny.

I have given here but a part of Aristotle's argument. Those who wish

to reject logic should point out, if they can, what flaws the argument contains. They should also state clearly what laws govern their own use of language. If they reject excluded middle and deny that three is either odd or even, let them tell what three is. If they go further and deny the laws of validity, so that the premise, No triangles are squares, would not imply the conclusion, No squares are triangles, let them tell whether any inferences are possible or not, and by what criteria they distinguish valid inferences from fallacies. And all this they must do without making surreptitious use of the principles they deride.

Unless the arguments of Aristotle can be squarely met, the traditional logic will serve as a basis for intellectualism and for a literal use of language in religion as well as in every other subject. Croce's dictum that all language is metaphorical or none is, must be denied. It is a fallacy to suppose that the sentence, Jesus was born of a virgin, cannot be literally intended, on the ground that the other phrase, Jesus is seated at the right hand of God the Father Almighty, cannot be other than metaphorical. Contrary to Croce, a logician, one who thinks accurately, must maintain that metaphors exist only because words have literal meanings. To understand Milton's leaden stepping hours of time, one must know that boots weighted with lead reduce the speed of anyone who wears them. The point of similarity may be wisely or stupidly selected; but unless a word has a literal meaning, the comparison which the metaphor attempts cannot be made. If there were no literal lions, the phrase, the lion of the tribe of Judah, would be totally meaningless.

One final consideration may also be adduced in defense of language and logic. The opposite viewpoint sometimes looks at language as a "social" phenomenon which, though it serves roughly for most daily necessities, is inadequate for accurate metaphysical, theological, or even scientific purposes. But whatever reason is put forward for the inadequacy either of language or its conceptual content, it would seem that Christian theism can and indeed must take a different position.

Christianity maintains both that language is a gift from God and that society is completely under his control. This is not to say that everybody uses language adequately or that nobody makes a blunder in logic. But whatever misapplications of principles are made, there is no inherent defect in language or logic that justifies their being regarded as inadequate for their purposes. And these purposes include the formulation of a detailed theology, literally intended. Strange as it may at first seem, the one sense in which all language may be called symbolic guarantees its adequacy. Words are conventional symbols. As sounds or letters they have no meaning of

their own. There is nothing in a given word or sign to prevent it from standing for any reality you choose. The words God and Dieu are equally satisfactory signs or symbols, and in some unknown tongue Naig would do as well. But because all words are symbolic in this sense, their meaning in speech can be literal when desired. Admittedly, there is a problem respecting the communication of ideas, but it is a problem that St. Augustine discussed rather well without denying the possibility of literal meaning.

We have of course been born into a society where the conventional symbols have long ago been selected, and you and I have little opportunity to coin new terms. Neither did Moses in Egypt. Yet the doctrine of inspiration requires us to believe that God gave Moses an Egyptian education as well as a fluency in Hebrew, so that when the time came Moses was fully prepared, spiritually, mentally, and linguistically to express accurately and adequately the message God had for his people.

There are indeed metaphors and symbols in that revelation; but "Thou shalt not steal" is literal.

## THE GOSPEL SONG — GOOD OR BAD?

R. RICE NUTTING

Music occupies a most important place in Christian worship. The organ prelude, the anthem, the sacred song, the congregational hymn — these are the music of worship. It is this music which prepares the heart and mind for the Word of God and directs the Christian's thoughts heavenward. And the most important function must be attributed to the hymn, for through congregational song, the individual may assume a closer communion with God, as well as share his praise and devotion with others.

Our hymnody is derived from various sources: Hebrew chant, plainsong, German chorale, folksong, secular tune, metrical psalm, gospel song. Of all these forms, the most controversial is the gospel song. To some liturgical Christians it is common and vulgar — a thing to be condemned. To others, of a non-liturgical faith, it is the most sincere expression of one's beliefs. Can both of these attitudes be correct? On what basis can a valid decision be made? Too often an answer is given which is based solely upon prejudice, ignorance, or some other superficial reason. A brief resume of the historical development of the gospel hymn should provide a firm basis for further evaluation.

Until the 18th century, church music in America was limited to the singing of psalms in metrical form. These paraphrased versions met the

demand that there be no music in the church that was not Scriptural. A well-known example, found in many present-day hymnals, is the metrical version of Psalm 90 by Isaac Watts, "O God, Our Help in Ages Past," sung to the tune, "St. Anne." A metrical version of Psalm 23, from the *Scottish Psalter* (1650), is typical of the period:

The Lord's my Shepherd, I'll not want;  
He makes me down to lie  
In pastures green; He leadeth me  
The quiet waters by.

My soul He doth restore again;  
And me to walk doth make  
Within the paths of righteousness,  
E'en for His own Name's sake.

Yea, though I walk in death's dark vale,  
Yet will I fear none ill;  
For Thou art with me; and Thy rod  
And staff me comfort still.

My table Thou hast furnished  
In presence of my foes;  
My head Thou dost with oil anoint,  
And my cup overflows.

Goodness and mercy all my life  
Shall surely follow me;  
And in God's house forevermore  
My dwelling place shall be.

Prior to the American Revolution, a revival movement was begun among various denominations, particularly the Congregationalists in Massachusetts, under the leadership of Jonathan Edwards, George Whitefield, and others. This "Great Awakening" was brought about as a result of opposition to institutionalized religion as represented by the Church of England. The Anglican Church and the revivalists differed not only concerning the matter of religious liberty, but they also stood opposed to each other in regard to music.

The slow Psalm tunes sung by New England Christians were too sedate and, in other ways, entirely unsuitable for use by the revivalists. What was needed was something fresh and interesting, a text not limited to the Scriptural rigidity of the Psalms. This need was met by Isaac Watts, a dissenter, whose hymns became so popular that by 1800 they completely dominated the hymnody in most churches. A number of his works remain favorites even today, included among which are "When I Survey the Wondrous Cross," "Alas! and Did My Saviour Bleed," "Joy to the World! the Lord Is Come," and "Am I a Soldier of the Cross."

Following the Revolution, religious freedom became more widely

realized with the formation of many new sects among the various denominations, especially the Methodists and Baptists. The latter split into such new sects as the Free Will Baptists, the Merry Dancing Baptists, and others. Supporting this movement, new hymns of a folk-like quality were written, praising the virtues of the various groups. These hymn texts were published without tunes until after the turn of the century. At first, texts of the folk hymns and "homemade" religious ballads which were employed in the revival movements were sung to fiddle tunes, jigs, ballads, and other secular tunes. This was a natural development, considering the nature of the revival movements and their appeal to the person of lesser literate and musical qualifications.

At the beginning of the 19th century, a new revival movement appeared, first in Kentucky, then in other parts of the South, whose outcome was the "camp meeting," an interdenominational gathering of fervent Christians. These meetings often lasted for weeks and frequently were marked by what has been described as mass hysteria. The music of the camp meeting was the well-known folk hymn of previous years, livened up, with partially remembered texts filled out with refrains and much repetition, the entire song made over into a more boisterous type of music. These songs were known by various names—revival songs, chorus songs, spiritual songs, camp meeting songs.

None of this music appeared in hymnals until near the middle of the 19th century. When it did appear, however, its notation was different from that which we see in present-day hymnals. The so-called shape-note system made use of different-shaped note heads—triangular, diamond, oval, square, etc.—to represent the syllables of solmization: do, re, mi, fa, sol, la, ti. This was considered a convenience in teaching the hymns to the rural folk, for whom they were intended. It was, of course, an improvement over the previous practice of learning by rote, which was made necessary because of the lack of published music. Today, hymn books of the Southern Baptist Church are published both in conventional notation and in the shape-note system.

It was not long before singing schools were organized by travelling "singing masters." In these schools, which lasted one or two weeks, the singing master taught the people how to read music with the aid of shape-notes and the corresponding syllables. A typical manner of singing was as follows: the leader gave the tonic pitch and the song was sung through, first with the syllables, then with the text. Because of the popular appeal of the folk hymns, numerous conventions were organized with "all-day singing and dinner on the ground." This still is a popular pastime in the rural South,

notably in Kentucky, Alabama, and Georgia. The usual procedure is to sing every song in the book before repeating a song.

The above historical explanation of the folk hymn is given because it was out of this music that the gospel song developed. This folk music multiplied rapidly, and it was not long before certain composers recognized it as a trend which could be exploited. Soon a voluminous output of songs was being published, the chief characteristics of which were a gospel text combined with rather stereotyped music having a catchy rhythm. The gospel song, at first, was little different from the folk hymn, but upon being subjected to the machine-like production of the gospel song writers, it soon lost the naivete and homely attractiveness of the folk hymn and became stereotyped and utterly common.

From the middle of the 19th century on, the gospel song became a popular feature of prayer meetings, Sunday Schools, and revivals. Even today it occupies a prominent place in American hymnody, and in many congregations it is the only religious music known, assuming an importance out of all proportion to its quality. An astonishing number of books with such music has been published and continues to be widely distributed. (More than 50,000,000 copies of Sankey's gospel song collections were sold!). There are several reasons for the immense popularity of the gospel song during the last century. Perhaps foremost is the fact that it was in grateful contrast with the traditional psalmody of the church. Not to be ignored is the innate love of folk music by many peoples. With this in mind, it is little wonder that this music of lilting tunes and ballad-like verses was eagerly acclaimed by such folk. Indeed, its style was so catchy that it tended to prevent attention to any other music. The movement reached a climax at the end of the century and burst into world prominence with the evangelistic work of Dwight L. Moody and his song leader, Ira D. Sankey. It has been perpetuated throughout this century by the Salvation Army and evangelists of all denominations.

A few of the better known song writers are named below. Charles C. Converse (1832-1918), "What a Friend We Have in Jesus"; William H. Doane (1832-1915), "More Love to Thee," "Rescue the Perishing"; William G. Fischer (1835-1919), "I Love to Tell the Story"; Philip P. Bliss (1838-1876), "Wonderful Words of Life," "Let the Lower Lights Be Burning"; Ira D. Sankey (1840-1908), "The Ninety and Nine"; Homer Rodeheaver (1880-1955), "Brighten the Corner Where You Are"; George C. Stebbins (1846-1945), "There Is a Green Hill Far Away"; and many, many others. A list of more recent composers can be compiled by looking into any present-day gospel hymn book.

An interesting side element, incidental to our discussion, is the relationship between gospel song and Negro spiritual. It has been speculated that writers of gospel songs have had far more to do with the development of the spiritual than have the Negroes themselves. For it is claimed that these songs are merely the Negro's own version of songs he heard from revivalists and missionaries, each version reflecting his surroundings, superstitions, beliefs — his nature.

The gospel song has been subjected to much criticism and abuse ever since its inception in the 19th century. Its text has been ridiculed as "an irritatingly priggish assumption of Christian superiority";<sup>1</sup> its music has been called coarse and cheap. Its composers and authors have been accused of exploiting a popular trend for commercial reasons; they are known in some circles as "the religious section of Tin-Pan Alley." Such words as "illiterate" and "naive" have been used to describe those who adhere to this music. Sentiment against use in the church of music such as this was vehemently expressed in 1897 by John Hubbard, a professor at Dartmouth College.

From the midnight revel, from the staggering bacchanal, from the profane altar of Comus, they have stolen the prostituted Air, and with sacrilegious hands have offered it in the Temple of *Jehovah* . . . Such profanation must wound every feeling heart. Devotion ever assumes a dignity. It cannot delight in the tinkling bustle of unmeaning sounds. The air of a catch, a glee, a dance, a march, a common ballad is very improper for the worship of the Most High . . .<sup>2</sup>

This would lead one to ask, What kind of music *is* proper in the worship service? What qualifications are demanded of a hymn if it be acceptable for use in church? In evaluating the quality of such music, the following elements might be considered: setting of the text, rhythm, melody, tonality, harmony. Rev. Richard A. Isaac (rector of St. Stephen's Church, Woodlawn, New York City) has expressed the following views:

The setting of the text and the accentuation of syllables and words must be properly expressive and natural. The rhythm should have plenty of life and movement without levity and dignity without heaviness. The melody of all parts should be interesting — shapely in outline, without angularity. The tonality, as a general rule, should be diatonic. The harmony should be simple but interesting . . .<sup>3</sup>

That this subject is of vital importance to every Christian, and cannot be lightly dismissed, is emphasized by Rev. Isaac.

Many persons have been influenced deeply by the music heard in church and many find great help and inspiration in having a part in singing the praises of God with heart and voice . . . To maintain a quality of music and to bequeath that tradition to succeeding generations is both a great privilege and a grave responsibility under God.<sup>3</sup>

In the light of the foregoing remarks, can it be said that the gospel song is a legitimate part of Christian hymnody? Can its continued association

with Christianity and divine worship be held valid? An examination of a typical song reveals qualities which, at the outset, would appear to be inconsistent with that which is acceptable praise to God. Salient features include a rather obvious melody based upon a simple harmonic accompaniment, usually without modulation. The music is carried along with a rhythmic swing and flow which, together with the lilting tune, creates an emotional effect that is considered quite stirring and pretty by many people. The gospel text, which often is associated with the doctrine of salvation by grace, is set to a verse-and-refrain type of structure with much textual repetitivity, especially in the refrain where basses and tenors frequently echo sopranos and altos, thusly: In the sweet— (In the sweet) — By and by — (By and by).<sup>4</sup> An examination of the component elements of various gospel songs will further substantiate the foregoing remarks.

From the very beginning, the gospel song had a strong influence in the lives of rural folk of the South and West, people who knew little, if any, other music. The text, for one thing, was especially attractive. This was due not only to the simplicity of doctrine, or to the easily remembered textual repetitions; but also appealing was the practical reference to the Christian's everyday problems, written in a language easily comprehended by him. This practice was continued during the early part of the present century in such hymns as, "No Depression in Heaven," "Mother's Prayers Have Followed Me," "Throw Out the Life-Line," and others. This attempt by song writers to make God and His ways more comprehensible to our finite minds by bringing Him down to the level of man has resulted in some of the most deplorable examples of religious music imaginable. A contemporary gospel chorus apparently fails to distinguish between sensuous emotion and Godly love, when it says:

I fell in love with Jesus,  
At the cross of Calvary.  
I fell in love with Jesus,  
And now, praise God, I'm free!

His grace is like a river  
Flowing on eternally.  
And I know He'll keep me for His own,  
And some day His face I'll see.

The music to which the gospel text is set sometimes is of a disturbingly incongruous character. It is disquieting to hear "Down at the cross where my Saviour died" sung to a galloping rhythm of dotted eighth and sixteenth notes. To hear the same rhythm applied to "Jesus is a Rock in a weary land, A shelter in the time of Storm" is but to contradict the strength and stability implied by the text. One might well question the propriety of singing the

words, "At Calvary's cross I met a Friend, Who touched my broken heart . . ."—in waltz time!

The simplicity of the harmonic accompaniment is evidenced in the typical use of tonic, dominant, and subdominant harmonies only. Occasionally the tune will be supported with just a simple alternation of tonic and dominant chords. (Despite the unattractiveness of the linear element, it is surprising how often a congregation will sing what they fondly believe to be alto, tenor, and bass parts). An unimaginative harmonization is sometimes made even more crude by a part-writing that would not do credit to a first year harmony student. Sensitivities are further strained when another part is made to accompany the melody in saccharine thirds or sixths. The composer of the gospel chorus, a rather recent innovation, has been influenced to a marked degree by the harmonizations from Tin-Pan Alley. What else can explain the chromatic chordal progressions, the sensuousness of which often rivals Wagner? Even Debussy is suggested by the parallel sevenths and ninths!

What can explain the wide influence of this type of music? It has been accepted to such a degree that many hymnbooks are comprised of gospel songs exclusively; and other hymnals of quite a respectable quality have included one or more of these tunes. Homer Rodeheaver has written a most sincere, and perhaps valid, defense of this type of music.

The gospel song is a declaration of God's plan of salvation and his promises, addressed to the people. We can bring you thousands of illustrations of individuals whose lives have actually been changed by the message of the gospel song, and who have become assets in their communities where they were liabilities before. These songs are not written for prayer meetings, but to challenge the attention of people on the outside who have not been interested in any form of church work or worship. They are used simply as a step from nothing to something. If critics knew how some of these songs were loved by many people, they would never refer to the "saccharine talents" of great and good men who have blessed the world with their songs.<sup>5</sup>

If it is granted that this music came into being because of a definite need, can that excuse its flagrant misuse today by Christians of average intellect and culture? One must respect the fact that many, many people have been brought to Christ *because* of gospel music; but one also would suspect that many have come to know our Saviour *in spite* of gospel music. In many instances, it has exerted such a corrosive influence that Christians have allowed an insidious secularism to dominate their culture. For what other reason would evangelical Christians accept with complete favor such pseudo-religious songs as are currently heard on the juke box, the radio and television? Or how does one explain the inconsistency of thought which labels jazz as un-Christian but accepts it as a vehicle for sacred poetry?

In conclusion, we must insist that although a few gospel songs are sincerely stirring and touching, the Christian must not allow this to limit his cultural and intellectual growth. It is disturbing that the witness of the church should reflect the triteness and crudeness of music which is inconsistent with the very nature of our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ.

#### FOOTNOTES

- 1 Archibald T. Davison, "Hymn, English," *Harvard Dictionary of Music*, 1951, p. 347.
- 2 J. T. Howard, *Our American Music*, 3d ed., 1946, p. 59.
- 3 In *The Diapason*, 549 (August, 1955), 23.
- 4 This feature is not new to church music. Textual repetition also appeared in some 18th century English hymns in which the arbitrary arrangement of words is said to have occasionally produced unfortunate distortions of sense: "He's our best bul--, He's our best bul--, He's our best bulwark still."
- 5 Howard, *op. cit.*, pp. 611-612.

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# THE PLACE OF DRAMA IN CHRISTIAN COLLEGES

MIRIAM ROSE BONNER

What place, if any, should drama have in the curriculum of the Christian liberal arts college and the Bible college? This question has been asked by Christian educators, with differing answers. That many values accrue to the individual from the study of and production of dramatic works is an indisputable fact. That there are difficulties, and perhaps some dangers in this field is also undeniable. It has been the problem of the individual Christian educator to decide what weight to attach to the values and the difficulties, and to prepare his curriculum in line with his personal views and whatever opinions he could glean from the experiences of others.

Historically, we know that drama often has gone hand in hand with religion. Of course Greek drama, a direct outgrowth of the worship of Dionysus, is an example of this. Eastman and Wilson say, "To the Greeks [the plays] were the principal means of cultivating the spiritual and ethical life."<sup>1</sup> When drama was separated from religion, as it was in Rome, it suffered decline. Medieval drama grew from the church, to add interest and variety to the service conducted in Latin, which was not the language of the people. Again, there was a drawing apart of drama from the church, with its subsequent degeneration, causing the church which had introduced it to disown it and ban it. When drama has had its roots in religion, one can but feel that it still has strong religious potential, even in the field of purely Christian observance. An art form such as this should be used to honor the Lord Jesus Christ, not given over to evil use. "In drama religion has an ally whose potential ability to develop beauty and strength in the spiritual life is comparable only to that of music. In some respects it is even greater than music, for the drama, more than music, has to do with the revelation of human character."<sup>2</sup>

At the present time there is a resurgence of interest in religious drama. Within the framework of the term "religious" we may narrow our discussion to evangelical or truly Christian drama. These terms should be defined. Eastman and Wilson consider that there has come to be a new definition of religious drama. "It is not the material it deals with, but the total effect of the play upon the audience. If a play sends an audience away exalted in spirit, with a deeper sense of fellowship with God and man, it has been religious."<sup>3</sup> They come closer to the Christian standard with the statement that it is "a means of ministering to the souls of men through a great art."<sup>4</sup>

Religion is "any system of faith or worship; outward manifestation of

belief in a superior being" according to Webster. As it might be stated, it is a reliance on something. Christian faith specifies on whom we have reliance—the Lord Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord. So Christian drama must honor Him. A Christian play does not have to be limited to dealing with a conversion situation, as some suppose, but may concern the growth of an individual in faith and in Christian graces.

There are many more "religious" plays which can be purchased than truly Christian plays. A great deal more is known about the broad field of religious drama than about the smaller area that could be specified as Christian drama.

Several surveys have been conducted to discover the extent of the use of religious drama. Of 364 churches studied in sixteen states of the Middle West in the 1930's, 322 reported that they had produced a total of 947 plays during the year. Of these 318 were classified as Biblical, 425 as non-Biblical but religious. Reports from 209 stated that the plays were produced for the purpose of inspiration of the audience, and 110 expressed the purpose as being for the education of the players. In the city of Chicago alone, a study of its 276 churches revealed that 216 of them were producing religious plays—647 dramas and pageants in twelve months.<sup>5</sup> This number has, of course, greatly increased in recent years.

Besides its use in churches, consider the wide use now being made of religious drama by means of films, radio, and television. The possibility of extending its use through these media is challenging.

Moseley suggests that dramatic art has had two functions in relation to religion: "worship, defined as the outreach of the human soul toward the Unknown, and religious instruction. The age-old association of drama and religion is rooted in the very nature of man's religious and expressive life."<sup>6</sup> Dramatic method is not wrong, but the material which has been used has sometimes created distaste for the method. Drama can be used for the glory of God. It can exalt our Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ. Already it has been used extensively for this purpose—not just in the broad field of religion, but in the specific field of Christian faith. The possibilities here are expanding continually. Dr. Bob Jones, Jr. comments most interestingly on this in the April, 1945 issue of *Sunday magazine*.<sup>7</sup>

A number of companies are producing strongly evangelical films. The famous WMBI dramatic program "Unshackled" is an example of the use radio is making of Christian drama, and the Lutheran television program "This is the Life" exemplifies what is being done through that medium. Drama is considered television's most effective format. More should be done in Christian programming. A truly Christian drama can have a power-

ful effect on the audience. There are some individuals that a sermon could scarcely reach, who can be touched by the message of salvation in dramatic form. Vespers plays at Bob Jones University have brought about the conversion of numbers of individuals. A play written by a faculty member was given in a church in a distant state with a resultant seventeen conversions in one evening — more than that church had ever had at one service before. Christian films, radio, and television also have been the means of salvation to thousands.

If drama is to be used effectively for the glory of God, as it should be, our young people are going to have to be trained in its technique. That is where the Christian liberal arts colleges and Bible colleges have their place. For drama can and should be taught in a Christian setting to those who hope to use it in the Lord's service. For a number of reasons, the educator planning the speech curriculum of the Christian college should not overlook drama courses and the use of dramatic material. Besides the need of trained leaders mentioned above, he should consider among other factors the values to the individual student for his personality development and improvement in speech skills. Study of speech is the "near way" to personality betterment. This deserves more lengthy comment, but let me simply refer to Dr. Elwood Murray<sup>8</sup> for further discussion of the subject. Drama, specifically, gives the student much that other speech forms do not.

When the individual portrays several characters as in reading-cuttings of plays, not only is his power of observation sharpened and his understanding of people increased, but his own speech instrument acquires greater flexibility — that is, he learns to control pitch changes rapidly, increase his pitch range, and learn fine points about quality, force, and rate changes. The necessity for improved technique is more apparent as he works on reading-cuttings of dramatic material than, perhaps, in any other type of speech work.

Study of pantomime is a very practical demonstration of the true adage that "actions speak louder than words," and it enables the student to think below mere surface ideas. He is trained in the general semantics discipline of the "silent level," where one does not brashly break into words, but thinks before he speaks or acts. His powers of observation are sharpened, as is his insight into why people behave as they do. For the prospective Christian worker, these are values of inestimable worth.

"Acting" is a word the Christian educator should not have to say with "bated breath." As the student deals with real people in Biblical and other historical plays, and with imaginary people, he is learning facts he might not acquire in any other course, he is broadening his understanding of those

from environments quite different from his own, he is learning cooperation with others, he is enriching his personality, and developing his speech skills.

Production of drama, with its many diversified courses that may be offered, has its particular values. Study of directing would develop desirable leadership qualities, the ability to work under pressure, the "knack" of co-ordinating, tact in handling people. Study of scene design and of costuming both lead to history and make that subject interesting, perhaps for the first time. As the student works in these lines he may develop some artistic "bent" which even he did not know he possessed. Every prospective minister, young people's director, Sunday School superintendent should know something about "putting on a program." If these have some directed training in what can be accomplished with settings, lights, costumes, etc., they can produce programs which will not sink quite as far below the standard of television productions as some church programs do. After all, the young people of the churches nowadays are well-acquainted with staging, scenery, lighting, and special effects.

Today, more than ever before, we are faced with the problem of keeping Christian productions on a high level, for there is so much to compare them with, and we want the comparison to favor the cause of Christ. Whether or not churches are going to produce *plays*, they are certainly going to have programs of some kind — Rally Day, Christmas, etc. If the person in charge knows something about dramatic production, the results will be much more gratifying than if an untrained individual does it.

The Christian dramatic program would not always have to be a play. There is the Vesper type of program in which musical numbers and readings (both prose and poetry) are centered around a theme, and all with spiritual impact. When there is added to the excellence of the numbers a beauty of staging, lighting, and dress, the effect is charming, but more than that, it can honor the Lord Jesus Christ in a very special way.

Christian films are fine, and many churches are using them to give variety to their evening services. However, they should not always take the place of the group activity of the church producing its own Christian message in dramatic form.

Young people need to be trained to take places of leadership in the use of drama in churches, in Christian film production, radio, and television. The program of drama in the Christian liberal arts college and the Bible institute may not be extensive, if the school is small and the number of teachers available limited, but it is to be hoped that this training will not be neglected. Even when only a few speech courses can be offered in a

school, the emphasis on dramatic material can be made in these. If a fairly wide course offering can be made, that is desirable.

Because speech is such an essential "tool subject" in the present and future life of each student, every school should offer at least one course in speech, and this course should be *required*.

A young prospective minister may receive quite thorough grounding in subjects theological, but if he is deficient in speech ability, he cannot be successful in the ministry. The fact of the need of general speech training is so evident that it needs no discussion. Let us therefore turn to a consideration of the material of the *one* speech course—if there can be only one offered—or the first speech course where others may follow. This should certainly include some dramatic material. A few Shakespearian quotations are to be found in practically every book published for initial college speech courses. Generally there are other play portions given as well, with the idea of enriching the student's background and improving his speech skills.

The second speech course, for a school offering only two, usually is public speaking. Although the student's platform work in this will be mostly of the sort in which he uses his own ideas—extemporaneous mode—one will notice in looking over textbooks designed for public speaking that the authors have included some dramatic literature (as well as poetic and narrative) for the student's work on technique. This is indicative of the esteem which speech educators in general have for the dramatic form as a means for the individual's improvement in speech and his general personality development.

Many colleges, including Christian colleges and Bible schools, have a speech course (usually on the second year level) in oral interpretation of literature. This generally includes, besides poetry and narrative forms, the dramatic form of literature also for intensive study and practice. In going over the catalogues of sixteen Christian liberal arts colleges<sup>9</sup> I found that fourteen of them have courses in oral interpretation of literature.

Twelve of these sixteen schools have courses definitely labelled "drama." Of these one has seven courses in drama, one has five, three have four, two have three, and the rest one each. This study did not include Bob Jones University, which has a complete drama department, offering a major in dramatic production and a graduate program also. This is in addition to courses in drama related to radio, television, and cinema. It is interesting to read the catalogue notes on the courses offered by the different schools. Under "Interpretation of Shakespearian Drama" one said, "To prepare students for greater service rather than for personal exploitation." No doubt this is the standard held by all Christian schools offering drama.

One of our graduate students, Mrs. Mardell Clemens, is presently engaged in a research project on "values and difficulties in study of and production of drama in Christian education." She is using the questions-by-mail and interview techniques. While the results are not all in yet, the Christian young people using drama in churches and in Christian schools are overwhelmingly in favor of the use of drama, believing that its values *far* outweigh any difficulties. They discuss its value to them in such words as these: "Being in plays helped me with a general problem of concentration on the job at hand . . . I learned to work for finesse, and not to be satisfied with less than my best." "It gave me ease before people and the ability to express my own thoughts in better language than I used before participation in dramatic productions." "I learned timing and poise, the necessity for motivating movements, how to be alert in reacting to the *whole* situation." "Participation in drama develops the individual's personality, even aiding in overcoming problems and maladjustments." "The student is helped to understand all sides of life . . . vital lessons in character building may be learned." "It gives better understanding of people . . . helps us to be better prepared for the problems we will face in life."

One of our graduates, a successful evangelist, expresses gratitude for the opportunities of being in dramatic productions — both the Shakespearian plays, which helped him with his all-round development, and the Christian vesper plays. It was during rehearsal of one of these latter that the young man was brought to the acceptance of the Lord Jesus Christ as his Saviour.

It is my considered opinion that Christian colleges should not limit themselves to the study of Christian plays alone, for the field is not wide enough. There simply are not enough *good* Christian plays. For classroom study and production there are the classical plays which have stood the test of the centuries. For public performance, too, these are possibilities. A Christian school should excel others in the production of that which is truly excellent. It is for the honor of our Lord, not for personal aggrandizement. And for public performance also there are some good Christian plays, and even religious plays which can be reworded a bit to give evangelical emphasis; and, there is the possibility of finding writing talent among one's staff members and students leading to the production of original dramas.

As Christian educators we should not ignore the widening field of Christian service which needs young people trained in drama. The Christian colleges and Bible schools can meet the need for Christian leadership in church drama, radio, television, cinema. It may take some changes in the speech curriculum to do this, but the results will make it worthwhile. Many there are for whom sermons will never have any appeal, but who cannot

escape the Gospel message presented in dramatic form. Our young people should be trained to give the gospel in this extremely effective manner.

#### FOOTNOTES

- 1 Eastman, Fred, and Wilson, Louis, *Drama in the Church*. Samuel French, N.Y., 1942, page 9.
- 2 *Ibid.*, page 4.
- 3 *Ibid.*, page 18.
- 4 *Ibid.*, Foreword.
- 5 *Ibid.*, page 19, 20.
- 6 Moseley, J. Edward, *Using Drama in the Church*. Bethany Press, St. Louis, 1955, page 12.
- 7 Jones, Bob, Jr., "Drama in the Church," *Sunday*, April 1945, page 22.
- 8 Murray, Elwood, *The Speech Personality*. J. P. Lippincott Co., N.Y., 1944, chapter 6.
- 9 Cf. "Look What's Happening on the Campus," *Moody Monthly*, Sept., 1955, page 23.

## MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LITERATURE\*

RALPH E. HONE

In the Book Section of the New York *Herald-Tribune* for March 28, 1954, there appeared an article entitled "The Reader's Responsibility, or How to Tell a Dirty Book When You Read It," by the American novelist Jessamyn West. Although the focal point of the article is the *reader* and the necessarily imposed limitations were confined to the reader's responsibility to recognize *dirty books*, yet the discussion is an important phase of the larger, ever-recurring, and important topic of *the moral responsibility of literature*.

Miss West is concerned with the reader's responsibility because she feels that some of her books have been mis-labeled by the critics. An apparent irony exists in this: the word *clean* has (to use Miss West's phrase) reared "its ugly head" in such criticism, threatening to damn with faint praise. A book the author hoped to produce with "some literary value" has become something with "therapeutic value" merely. "This is the more ironical," says Miss West, "since I so firmly believe not only that all good writing is clean but that many formally clean books are not only poor as writing but are, in a positive way, dirty."

\* This paper was read to the section of college teachers of English in Christian schools at the Modern Language Association meeting at the Palmer House, Chicago, December 27, 1955.

Obliged to define her way through this equivocation, the writer says:

The book with four-letter words, the book that concerns itself with violence and passion, and particularly with violence and passion as they relate to sex, may or may not be dirty; and the book without them may or may not be clean. The good book is clean not because it refuses to face the fact of evil in the world, not because it shuts its eyes to the malice and envy and lust which disfigure the lives of most of us, but because it tells the truth about these things, about life generally, and specifically about the life which it has created within its own covers . . . So then, as I am using the word, the dirty book is the one which, with or without the aid of violence, sex and the four-letter words, falsifies life.

The movement of this definition seems to be: a *good* book is a *clean* book is a *true* book is a *good* book, etc., where *life* is the area explored. The reader has a grave responsibility to observe here:

Liking in fiction one of those great Gothic superstructures molded out of pure gelatine, artificially colored and flavored, and all a-quiver with an exaggerated pseudo-life which one thrust with a teaspoon will terminate, it is his responsibility, liking such fare, to see that he labels it neither literature nor life.

A corollary responsibility of the reader is not to ask the writer to be "a partial human being. Not to say to him: 'There is already so much pain, sorrow, misery and violence in the world, will you please ignore these distressing facts and concoct for our entertainment something light, bright and cheerful.'" If the writer functions "as completely as possible as a seeing, responding human being . . . as human being and artist," the writer will not "forget joy" also.

Devotion to the good, the true, and the clean in literature and life undoubtedly characterizes many responsible readers and writers the world around. Though it must immediately be observed that one man's good may be another man's evil, just as it is obvious that one man's (or woman's) dirty may be another man's clean. This is a way of pointing out, on the grounds Miss West allows, relativism not only in morals but also in life as well. There is thus in her reasoning a kind of double begging of the question.

Miss West explicitly asserts that the "dirty" book is the book produced by the author who *falsifies life*. I agree with the writer's words, but I must point out that I think her language is primarily a protest against disillusionment, and that it contains a very arbitrary interpretation.

It is interesting and significant to note that Miss West singles out certain things as the usual conception of the word *dirty*: "four-letter words;" "violence and passion, and particularly . . . violence and passion as they relate to sex;" "the malice and envy and lust which disfigure the lives of most of us." She is concessive to the appearance of these things in literature.

She seems unrelenting only toward the "dirty"-clean books of her youthful reading. If, she says, "I were going to permit a child to pick up the facts of life from fiction I think the modern hard-boiled school a better source than the older soft-boiled or addled school from which I picked up what I thought was information." Fewer post-reading adjustments, she thinks, would be required.

But who, it may be asked, is to determine whether or not a writer falsifies life? The touchstone for Miss West is the presence of "the transcendent values" (Keats' words) of the human heart, chief of which is *joy*. "Please notice," she says, "that the word is not happiness, contentment, peace of mind, gaiety, ease, or optimism, but *joy*." At this point of arbitrary assertion, it may be well to ask, Whose life must not be falsified? and to whom?

Is the matter one merely of taste and therefore beyond all disputing? If so, both Miss West and I have reduced our efforts to nothing.

Implicit in her article is the faith (if not a philosophy) that Man is distinguished by the good, and the true, and the joyous, etc. I have already suggested that the weakness of this view as here presented — humanism — is the absence of absolutes. Man is the measure of all things. The highest the humanist can attain is the second table of the law.

Some of us, on the contrary, hold the Judaeo-Christian philosophy that moral responsibility extends to all the law of God. To us the transcendent values in this world are the values of the human *soul redeemed*. We do not suppose that life on earth for any man is unmixed blessing. But we do believe that divine justice guarantees the ultimate vindication of righteousness. Thus we, too, would subscribe to the view that the "dirty" book is produced by the author who falsifies life. But with a difference.

We cannot enjoy the parading of four-letter words, violence and passion when these seem to exist for themselves alone. To make high things low is not only vulgarity, it is also profanity. It is not that we shelter ourselves behind silly inhibitions, nor pretend that hush-hush removes distasteful situations.

We are familiar with a Bible which is very frank, contains some four-letter words, relates scores of realistic incidents involving violence and passion, and sweeps through the gamut of human emotions, not forgetting misery or joy. But there is a decided difference: the Bible does not offer a *partial* story nor foster a *partial* human being. Its language, though frank, is not scatological. Its truths, arising in God, are *sub specie aeternitatis*.

To suggest that man is, always will be, and ought to be an animal merely is to us to falsify life.

To assume that man's chiefest joys arise from secular and materialistic sources is to us to falsify life.

To insinuate that in the place of an all-wise, over-ruling Providence there is indifference, no Providence, or cosmic evil is to us to falsify life.

This does not imply that we require man in fiction to be angelic, that he must always be spiritual-minded, that the world always must be roseate. If anything, the complexity of man deepens, the conflicts increase, and the convictions are not easily shaped.

Perhaps the difference we have been insisting upon may be pointed up by referring to an observation made by Robert Frost that there are at least two types of realism: one type is that of the man who brings you a potato scrubbed and clean and says, "This is a potato;" and another type, that of the man who fears that you will not recognize the potato unless he leaves dirt clinging to it.

## NOTES ON GENESIS 1: 1 — 2: 3

WILLIAM SANFORD LASOR

The appearance of a controversial book, because of its stimuli on other scholars, sometimes leads to the achievement of results far beyond the purpose of the author. A recent controversial book is *The Christian View of Science and Scripture* by Bernard Ramm (Grand Rapids, Mich.; Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1954). Ramm has challenged some of the interpretations of the early chapters of Genesis. In my opinion, just to reply to Ramm is to add little of positive value to Biblical scholarship. Whether Ramm is right or wrong (and he is probably sometimes the one, sometimes the other, but 100% neither!) makes little difference. I doubt whether Ramm himself would argue this point. But if he can lead Biblical scholars to reconsider the scriptural materials, then he has, willingly or not, advanced our understanding of the truth.

My purpose in this article is to present some of my findings in the first section of Genesis (Gen. 1:1 — 2:3), not so much as final truth — for that hope is as yet premature — but rather as an invitation for other students of the Word of God to join in the all-important task of discovering what God's word really says.

### A. The Structure of Genesis 1:1 — 2:3

Study of the structure of the first section of Genesis makes it clear that the section ends at 2:3. The formula, "and there was evening and there was morning, day \_\_\_\_\_," occurring six times (1:5, 8, 13, 19, 23, and 31), clearly divides the text into six subsections. The abnormal statement in 1:31

("And God saw everything that He had made, and, behold, it was very good"), in contrast to the recurring formula in 1:4, 12, 18, 21, and 25 ("And God saw that it was good"), suggests a terminal point, and the concluding description in 2:1-3 confirms this suggestion. Whether the first part of 2:4 is a subscription to the first section or a superscription to the next cannot be positively determined. In my opinion, this makes little difference in the interpretation of the first chapter, although it may be of significance for the study of the structure of the entire book of Genesis.

The study of the structure of Genesis 1:1—2:3 should be pursued by a number of scholars. What is obvious to one will not be obvious to another. Then, too, we all tend to overstate our conclusions, and we need to be corrected. This is a necessary part of the Protestant view of the right of private interpretation of Scripture.

I would suggest that there may be profit in studying the verb forms used in this section. There are many *jussives*,<sup>1</sup> some easily distinguishable by morphology, some only recognizable by context. The following may be noted:

- 1:3, Let there be light.
- 1:6, Let there be a firmament . . . and let there be a divider.
- 1:9, Let be gathered the waters (suggested by context; but note that *wərəd'ē* morphologically can not be jussive and should therefore be translated, "and there shall be seen the dry land.")
- 1:11, Let the earth cause grass.
- 1:14, Let there be light-makers (the term indicates something that causes light).
- 1:20, Let the waters swarm (suggested by context).
- 1:24, Let the earth cause to go forth.

We are forced to notice in several of these words the use of secondary causes. The "light-makers" are the secondary cause of the light. The earth is the secondary cause of grass and living creatures. The waters are the secondary cause of the living creatures in them, and even of the birds, it would seem, for the expression "and fowl shall fly" is not jussive.

The expression "fiat creation" is often used. The word "fiat" is taken from the Latin, where *fiat* means "Let there be." However, "fiat creation" usually means the instantaneous creative activity of God *ex nihilo*, whereas a study of the verb forms in Genesis 1:1-24 seems to suggest that God created by the use of secondary causes as well as by immediate creativity.

When we come to verse 26, however, we find a difference in expression: "And God said, Let us make man." I am not convinced that the distinction between the verb *'asá* ("he made") and the verb *bara'* ("he created") is as neat as is sometimes stated. Perhaps the use of these two verbs in Genesis 1:1—2:3, together with the command formulas used, should be restudied.

But I am convinced that the clear-cut change in formula at verse 26 is significant. It seems to say, At this point God's creative activity is carried out in a different manner than it has been in the preceding verses.

Is there room in the first chapter of Genesis for an evolutionary theory? Verses 11, 20, and 24 seem to allow it, provided it is an evolution controlled by God's creative will. But verse 26 seems to draw a line between that which has been done previously and that which God has made 'in His own image.' I shall not be dogmatic concerning scientific theories, for I do not believe the exegete of Scripture or the theologian should suppose himself to be a scientist. But I shall ask the scientist for a theory that does not violate the difference in creative activity suggested in verse 26, when it comes to the human being.

#### B. The Words *bara'* and *'asâ*

The need of restudying the verbs *bara'* and *'asâ* in the context of the command formulas has already been suggested. The word *bara'* is used in 1:1, 21, 27, and 2:3. The word *'asâ* is used in 1:7, 16, 25; 2:2, 3, and 4b. The imperfect with *waw*-conversive of *'asâ* ("and he made") is used after jussives as follows:

1:6-7, God said, Let there be a firmament . . . And God made the firmament . . .

1:14-16, God said, Let there be light-makers . . . And God made the two great light-makers . . .

1:24-25, God said, Let the earth cause to go forth living creatures after their kind,<sup>2</sup> cattle, creeping thing, and beast of the earth, after its kind; and it was so. And God made the beast of the earth after its kind, the cattle after its kind, every creeping thing of the ground after its kind . . .

On the other hand, the imperfect with *waw*-conversive of *bara'* ("and he created") is used after a probable jussive in the following passage:

1:20-21, And God said, Let the waters swarm a swarm of living things . . . And God created the great *tannînîm* (sea monsters?) and every creeping living being which the waters had swarmed after their kind . . .

It is admitted that morphologically (i.e., according to its form) we cannot determine that the word *yisrêsu* is jussive ("let swarm"). It could just as well be imperfect ("the waters shall swarm"), for the two forms are morphologically identical in the third person plural. However, we are required to use the logical abilities that God gave us, even in studying His word, and logic tells us (1) that jussives are used in the surrounding verses, and (2) that there is no particular significance to the particular creatures in this verse to require a different treatment. If the problem were found in verse 24, where the "higher orders" of animal life are mentioned, we might have sufficient reason to argue the point; but here there can be no question. We conclude that *bara'* as used in verse 21, is equivalent to *'asâ*, as used in verses 7, 16, and 25.

If confirmation is needed (and certainly we should seek every line of evidence), we note two other passages:

2:3, Which God created (*bārā'*) to make ('asā').

2:4b, In the day of God's making ('asā) earth and heaven.

In Genesis 1:1, it will be recalled, *bārā'* was used with reference to the creation of heaven and earth. This is clearly parallel to 2:4b. The two words are used together in 2:3. To complete the record we note that 'asā is used twice in 2:2, referring to all of God's work. In the light of this study we conclude, then, that the use of *bārā'* after "Let us make," in 1:26, is without significance in itself. This does not, however, void the significance of "Let us make," in 1:26, as we have already seen in our study of structure.

### C. The "Gap Theory"

Slightly different is the problem of Genesis 1:1 and its relation to the following verse. The study of structure should lead to the conclusion that verse 3 is similar to verse 6. Therefore verse 3 belongs to the subsection ending with verse 5. But does verse 2 belong to the same subsection, or does it belong with verse 1? This has important bearings on the "gap theory," or the view that an original creation is presented in Genesis 1:1, followed by a spoiling of that creation and a restoration of the ruined world in the balance of the chapter.

The problem is complicated at this point because of a syntactical phenomenon found in the Semitic languages but unknown in English and its cognates. We are forced to become technical to study this phenomenon.

In English and its cognates, we speak of the "genitive case." It is a "case" in English only in a few forms, such as "his" and "its." To show the relationship between two nouns (or between a noun and a pronoun), we use the "genitive:" "his book." This could also be expressed, "The book of him," or "the book of John." In the Semitic languages such relationship is shown by the "construct state." Originally, this was followed by the genitive case, as we know from Akkadian, Arabic, and Ugaritic. The first word is said to be "in construct" with its genitive. For example, Akkadian *bāb ili* ("gate of god"; the name of Babylon) is composed of *bāb* in the construct state and *ili* in the genitive case. When a word is 'in construct,' it undergoes a slight change in morphology, if the rules of vocalization allow it. Usually the vowels "become shorter." The definite article drops off. Sometimes an original ending will be preserved. These details are well known to every student of Hebrew.<sup>8</sup>

The first two words of Genesis 1:1 are noteworthy: *berē'sit bārā'*. The first word, as pointed, is in construct. In the absolute state (i.e., when not in construct), it would have had the definite article and therefore would have been *bārē'sit*. What complicates the problem is the fact that *berē'sit* is fol-

lowed by a finite verb. In English, we would feel the force of it if we were to translate it literally, "In the beginning of He created." This, to us, is nonsense.

The fact is, of course, well known. Scholars have made several attempts to solve the problem. The most common solution is that found in the critical notes of Kittel's *Biblia Hebraica* and the critical commentaries on Genesis, namely, to emend the vocalization of the verb so as to make it an infinitive construct (*bərē'sit bərō'*). This would then be translated, "In the beginning of God's creating of the heavens and the earth." Even this translation will point out the lesson we are going to learn—but I do not believe an emendation of the text is necessary.

One further fact complicates this problem: the loss of final short vowels in Massoretic Hebrew. In Akkadian, Arabic, Ethiopic, and Ugaritic, where the final short vowels are preserved (in Ugaritic, to be sure, only when the final consonant is *'aleph*), we have evidence of indicative and subjunctive forms of the verb. It is reasonable, beyond cavil, that Hebrew also had subjunctive forms in its earlier stages of development.

Now it is well known that a noun in construct can be used before a finite verb in the subjunctive in Akkadian to represent a dependent clause. In Hammurabi's Code, for example, *dīn idinu* ("the judgment of he judged"), means "the judgment which he judged,"<sup>4</sup> and *nādin iddinusum* ("the seller of he sold to him") means "the seller who sold to him."<sup>5</sup> Many other examples could be adduced. The phenomenon is recognized in the standard grammars.<sup>6</sup> Certain words which were originally nouns in construct have through usage become "prepositions" and "conjunctions" to our Western way of thinking. In Akkadian, *asar* ("the place of") and *bīt* ("in the house of") have become relative conjunctions meaning "where." Their original use is preserved in the subjunctive of the verb that follows.<sup>7</sup> Once this is recognized, it becomes apparent that quite similar usage of nouns and pronouns in construct with finite verbs is found in other Semitic languages, even though some grammars fail to recognize it.

It is not necessary to belabor the point in cognate languages. If we recognize that *asar* in Akkadian is originally a noun in construct, then we should have no difficulty accepting *'aser* in Hebrew (having the same meaning) as the same phenomenon. It is clearly a construct in morphology. Its original meaning is found in passages such as 2 Samuel 7:7, where *bēkol 'aser bithallākī* ("everywhere I went about") literally means "in every place of I walked about."

Once we recognize the use of a noun (or pronoun) in construct before a finite verb to be a common usage in the Semitic languages, indicating a

dependent or relative clause, it becomes unnecessary to emend the first two words in Genesis 1:1. Emendation, after all, is the easiest way out of a difficulty—and often it is the poorest. It takes no great knowledge to alter what you do not understand. I am not suggesting that there is no place for emendation. In some cases it is necessary on the basis of both intrinsic and extrinsic probability. But when a form can be satisfactorily explained without emendation, emendation should be avoided.

Genesis 1:1, then, in the light of this syntax, should be translated in somewhat the following manner: "In the beginning, when God created the heavens and the earth, and the earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep, and the Spirit of God was brooding over the face of the waters, then God said, 'Let there be light!' And there was light."

This translation accounts for the construct form of the first word. It may not be a temporal clause: any relative clause is possible. This translation accounts for the fact that the text avoids the use of *wayehi* ("and there was") until the end of verse 3. This translation, further, makes the words "Then God said, 'Let there be light!'" to be the first main clause. This, I believe, is in accordance with the structure of the entire first section.

But this translation makes the gap theory impossible. Since there is no independent clause in verse 1, there can be no completed "original, perfect creation" in that verse. And since verse 2 is parenthetical, with verse 3 as the first major statement, this cannot describe an intermediate state of ruin followed by a new creation.

Is there any line of confirmation for this exegesis? I believe there is.

Integral with the gap theory is the translation of *hayeta* in verse 2 by "became": "And the earth became waste and void." The question must be answered, Does the verb *hayá* mean "become" as well as "be"? There is in Hebrew an idiom that means "to become." It makes use of the verb *hayá*—but, so far as I have been able to discover, it is always followed by the preposition *l-*. Three examples occur in the first part of Genesis:

1:14, God said, Let there be light-makers in the firmament, . . . and they shall become signs . . .

1:15, And they became light-makers in the firmament . . .

2:7, And Adam became a living being.

The first two examples may not immediately commend themselves to the reader, since the translations given here do not follow the standard versions. The third, however (2:7), since it occurs in the King James Version and the standard revisions (A.S.V. and R.S.V.), should be convincing. In my opinion, the first two examples will prove to be more satisfactory translations after careful consideration.<sup>8</sup>

It should be added that the idiom *hayâ le-* does not always mean "to become." In Hebrew there is no verb "to have," and this idiom before proper nouns and pronouns regularly means "to have."

This problem is very complex. The verb *hayâ* occurs in Hebrew several thousand times, and, since *hayâ le-* is not separately listed, the task of running down all the cases where the expression is used, even with the aid of a Hebrew concordance, is formidable. English concordances are, at this point useless, since the use of *hayâ le-* with the meaning of "to become" has not been generally recognized by English translators. It therefore is not fitting for me to be dogmatic at this point, but simply to offer the conclusion as "highly probable until proven otherwise" that Genesis 1:2 should be translated, "And the earth was without form and void," and that it can not be translated, "And the earth became without form and void." Since the gap theory rests upon such questionable translation of Genesis 1:2, I hold that it is not to be based on this passage. If it is to be held, support for it must come from some other portion of the Scripture.

These are only some of the conclusions reached by a new study of Genesis 1:1—2:3. Many other points can be derived, I am sure, by careful exegesis of the passage. Since Ramm's book has turned the attention of many Christians to this passage, I suggest again that we would do well to combine our efforts to discover, not what we want to discover, nor, for that matter, what others may have discovered, but that which God truly has spoken.\*

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> The *jussive*, as the term is used in Hebrew grammars, describes the will of the speaker as directed toward another. It can be used in the first person, "(I would that) I might go" or "Let me go"; in the second person, "(I would that) you should bring it here," approximately equivalent to the imperative; or in the third person, "(I would that) it should bring forth" or "Let it bring forth."

<sup>2</sup> In Hebrew the singular is found, but this is awkward in English.

<sup>3</sup> This is greatly oversimplified. For a fuller treatment, see Emil Kautzsch, *Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar*, 2d English ed., translated by A. E. Cowley from the 28th German ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910), §89. The rules of vocalization are fully treated in my *Hebrew Handbook*, rev. ed. (Pasadena, 1955), §§16-17.

<sup>4</sup> *Code of Hammurabi*, §6:16.

<sup>5</sup> *Code of Hammurabi*, §9:19-20.

<sup>6</sup> Cf., e.g., Wolfram von Soden, *Grundriss der akkadischen Grammatik* (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1952), §166; and Arthur Ungnad, *Grammatik des Akkadischen*, 3d ed. (Munich: Biederstein Verlag, 1949), §16.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. W. von Soden, *op. cit.*, §175.

<sup>8</sup> Incidentally, the use of the idiom *hayâ le-* in the sense of "to become" will, I think, prove to be superior also in Genesis 9:13, where we read, "My bow I have put (past tense, not future!) in the clouds, and it will become a covenant sign between Me and the earth."

\*We regret that inability to procure all the accent marks originally included by Dr. LaSor, has made for certain inaccuracies. For these we ask the indulgence of both reader and author.

## PERSONALIA

**Gordon H. Clark** is Professor of Philosophy at Butler University, Indianapolis, Indiana. He holds both the A.B. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Pennsylvania. He was a scholarship student at the Sorbonne. Dr. Clark has taught at the University of Pennsylvania, the Reformed Episcopal Seminary, and Wheaton College. He is the author of a number of writings including: *Readings in Ethics* (with T. V. Smith), *Selections from Hellenistic Philosophy*, *A History of Philosophy* (with Martin, Clark, and Ruddick), *A Christian Philosophy of Education*, *A Christian View of Men and Things*, and articles on Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and theological subjects. Dr. Clark is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, the American Philosophical Association, A.A.A.S., and the American Philological Association.

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**Miriam Rose Bonner** is Professor of Speech at Bob Jones University. Dr. Bonner received her A.B. from Park College. Both the M.A. and Ph.D. were conferred by the University of Michigan. She has also studied at the University of Denver and the University of Virginia. Her dissertation, which was devoted to research in the field of stage fright, was published in the *American Journal of Psychology*. Dr. Bonner is a member of the Society of Sigma Xi.

**Ralph E. Hone** is Associate Professor of English at Wheaton College. He has also taught at Gordon College and New York University. Dr. Hone received his A.B. and M.A. from Ohio State University. New York University granted him the Ph.D. He is a member of the Modern Language Association.

## REVIEWS OF BOOKS

*General Revelation*, by G. C. Berkouwer. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1955. 332 pp. \$4.00.

The fifth in a series of nineteen monographs in dogmatics is now available to the needy English-reading world in Berkouwer's masterly volume *General Revelation*. The Professor of Systematic Theology at the Free University of Amsterdam has put in eleven chapters a subject which he handles deliberately, didactically as well as devotionally.

In the background chapter, the various controversies that have arisen, and some rather recently, are sketched in bold strokes to provide context for what follows. Very simply the author poses the question, "Is there a 'natural' knowledge of God and his will possible outside of the revelation of Jesus Christ?" (p. 15). Lest the reader stop at the end of the first chapter, the author encourages him to press on by observing, "There is no more significant question in the whole of theology and in the whole of human life than that of the nature and reality of revelation" (p. 17).

"Barth Against Natural Theology" sets forth the dialectical view with not only summary statement but with great care. One feels that Berkouwer thoroughly understands the Barthian position. With clarity and kindness he skillfully outlines current neo-orthodox opposition to a general revelation. "For him [Barth] the relationship rests upon a correct insight into the *knowability of God*" (p. 28).

"Reaction to Barth's Offensive" describes the similar response of divergent thinkers; namely, Emil Brunner and Paul Althaus. Berkouwer does this with characteristic continental certainty, point by point. The wide familiarity of our author with contemporary theology is challenging to the limited outlook of the average evangelical reader of theology. Those who are forced to do battle with contemporary theological thought will be encouraged to know that here is a scholar who has read widely with his hand on the pulse of "existential" man.

"The Natural Theology of Rome" demonstrates the acumen of the Amsterdam professor as with dexterity he threads his way skillfully through labyrinthine passages to point out with the searchlight of truth the Romish defense of reason. Here he finds the declared dogma, "The road to a knowledge of God is by way of logical conclusion" (p. 74).

With a variety of views now before the reader, Berkouwer addresses himself to the exposition and critique of the traditional Reformed views. "The pivotal question is whether we have the right to simply conclude from the exclusive salvation in Christ to the exclusive revelation in Christ" (p. 93). He uses both Hebrew and Greek exegesis as he searches the Scriptures for

their light. The search leads to the so-called "nature psalms." What a pity that so many evangelicals think so little of the Scriptures they uphold as to disdain the discipline of Hebrew and Greek in seminary. A worse travesty is seen in denominations or associations who will ordain such.

In "Revelation and Knowledge," the author quotes his colleague Herman Dooyeweerd, who is to honor America with a visit sometime in the next year. "Revelation and Fulfillment" reveals the author's grasp of the history of doctrine. Mastery of the fields of philosophy, apologetics, and church history are necessary to give us this final product. This is the longest chapter in the book and comprises one-fifth of the whole. "Revelation and Illumination" and "The Controversy Regarding Article II of the Belgic Confession" follow to round out rapidly the contemporary discussions in the field. The final chapter, "Universality and Particularity" summarizes Berkouwer's own conclusions on the subject. "Only from a scriptural point of view can the relationship between general and special revelation be rightly understood; only then is it possible to oppose all sorts of dangers which have continually threatened the church and her theology" (p. 292).

The book is a stimulant to the conservative to-day who is confused by hearing "many voices." Above all these is the voice of God in Scripture sounding one clear call in the direction of the "ancient paths." This book is the answer to those who are continually wanting a fresh statement of Reformed theology. The simple style, the common concepts, the clear expositions of Scripture, the warmth of devotion make this volume difficult to put down until one has read the whole. There are fourteen other volumes yet to be translated.

One is a bit surprised that in a volume of such high calibre one is catapulted into an area of tremendous magnitude without a word of introduction, foreword, or translator's preface. In fact, the identity of the translator does not appear at all. One can only presume it was done by John Vriend as *Faith and Sanctification* was. A three-page index of Scripture texts adds greatly to the value of such a Biblical study. However, a three-quarter page "General Index" is of little value for so great an amount of subject material. The format is good, the print clear, the volume light to handle, and the joy of reading greatly enhanced by putting the footnotes exactly where they belong: at the bottom of each page.

— Charles G. Schauffele

*Venture of Faith*, by Robert G. Torbet. Philadelphia: Judson Press., xiv + 634 pp. \$6.00.

Here is a much needed new book in the field of history of missions, a well documented and highly readable survey of fourteen decades of Ameri-

can Baptist missions, from 1814 to 1954. The writer, Dr. Robert G. Torbet, already the author of other books, was for some years Professor of Church History at Eastern Baptist Theological Seminary, and has had a lifelong interest in world missions.

The book is packed with excellent factual material which is made available for easy reference by a quite full index. Well-chosen brief biographies of notable missionaries, or striking incidents from their lives, bring highlights into the record.

Trends and movements on the various fields are carefully noted and interpreted, such as the development of the national churches, the cumulative effects of two world wars, and the effects of financial depressions and recoveries, both upon administrative problems at the home base and upon the field organization.

The author makes special note of the much discussed dissensions within Baptist circles which resulted in the formation of the "Association of Baptists for World Evangelism" in 1928, and of the "Conservative Baptist Foreign Mission Society" in 1943, with explanations drawn from the official records of the American Baptist missionary societies.

In his preface, Dr. Torbet says that he "has sought to write with an appreciative and appraising mind", a purpose which he seems to have carried out in this excellent survey.

For some readers, unusual interest will be found in the chapters on "Beachheads Outside of Asia" and "Continuing Witness in Europe", which deal with less known Baptist work in Liberia and in Europe. The closing chapter of summarization, "In Retrospect", concludes on a high note of faith in the future missionary outlook for the churches of the American Baptist denomination. "That which had begun as a venture of faith is continuing in a changing world with no diminution of dependence upon the Holy Spirit through whose power ordinary men and women have across the decades sustained hope in the face of despair and courage in the midst of defeat, and have at times accomplished miracles of grace in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ."

— Carrie A. Tarbell

*The Dead Sea Scrolls*, by Millar Burrows. New York: The Viking Press, 1955. Illust., xv + 435 pp. \$6.50.

The outstanding archeological event of the decade took place in the Spring of 1947 when a fifteen year old Bedouin shepherd stumbled upon a cave in the rocky hills bordering the Dead Sea. In the cave were found jars and ancient leather scrolls. The Biblical world was electrified when it learned

that among these scrolls was a complete copy of Isaiah dating from the first or second century B.C. Further explorations uncovered more manuscripts and a multitude of fragments. As the investigations continued and the results were disseminated in the scholarly world, a stream, quickly rising to flood stage, of books, articles, and speeches poured forth. The age of the manuscripts, the nature of the religious community at Khirbet Qumran, the historical relation of these matters, all these and more aroused the scholars, calling forth an exciting series of ardently defended and widely varied views.

One man was in a better position than perhaps anyone else to know all about the Dead Sea Scrolls. Millar Burrows was director of the American Schools of Oriental Research at the time of the discoveries, and has been in close touch with the whole story. Now he has given us the finest and fullest account, not only of the discoveries, but of the vast literature that has so quickly grown up around them and is likely to be further added to in the near future. His purpose was "to give a fairly definite idea of what the Dead Sea Scrolls are, why there has been so much excitement over them, and how they are important" (xv). He has succeeded admirably in achieving his purpose. The scholar will find an abundance of material, including an excellent bibliography of some fifteen pages, and the less learned will find here a clarity of expression and simplicity of presentation that is unique in the field of archeology.

Dr. Burrows deals in order with the history of the discoveries themselves, the age of the manuscripts, the dates of composition, the origin, history and organization of the community at Qumran, the importance of the scrolls, and finally includes a most-welcome section of translations of the more important finds. He sifts through the theories and conclusions of a multitude of scholars, fairly and clearly presenting their views and also the difficulties of their positions. He presents his own ideas with careful reserve, leaving to the individual reader ample room to consider the various possibilities and draw his own conclusions. We are delighted with the book and greatly indebted to Dr. Burrows for this most reasonable and readable volume.

— Philip C. Johnson

*Discovering Buried Worlds*, by Andre Parrot (tr. by Edwin Hudson). New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. 128 pp. \$4.75.

This book is the first of a promised new series of studies in Biblical archeology. The distinguished curator-in-chief of the French National Museums, Andre Parrot, presents in this brief survey an excellent introduction to one of the most exciting of intellectual pursuits. He takes us into the field with the archeologist, showing us his methods, problems and rewards.

Limiting himself to the area he himself knows so well, he gives us "The Saga of the Archeologists (1842-1952)", the men and discoveries of a century of excavation in the eastern arm of the Fertile Crescent. Perhaps the finest chapter in the book is that which paints a picture in broad perspective of 5000 years of civilization from the remarkable cultures of Hassuna and Obeid to the days of imperial Rome. He concludes with a short chapter indicating the importance of archeology for Bible study. We look forward to other books in the series, most of which will have the same author. Some of the titles listed are *The Flood and Noah's Ark*, *Mari and the Old Testament*, and *The Tower of Babel*.

While the book as a whole is to be praised, there are some matters questionable even in the writings of so eminent an archeologist as Parrot. The dating of Abraham in the days of Hammurabi is extremely doubtful. Reference to the ziggurat of Nebuchadnezzar's Babylon as the Biblical Tower of Babel is most amazing. And the insistence a number of times that the Phoenicians invented the alphabet is incredible in the face of the Proto-Sinaitic scripts. One other matter should be mentioned. The American price is far too high for so brief a monograph. The British price of seven shillings sixpence is much more realistic.

— Philip C. Johnson

*Foundations of Christian Knowledge*, by Georgia Harkness. New York: Abingdon Press, 1955. 160 pp. \$2.75.

The name of Georgia Harkness is a familiar one to readers of theological-philosophical literature. Some of her writings are more devotional in nature, others more didactic. The present volume falls within the latter group. The professor of applied theology at the Pacific School of Religion has given us in this short book an excellent introduction to the present debate on the sources and validity of Christian knowledge.

The reasons for writing the book were threefold: the basic character of epistemology in relation to the whole structure of Christian theology; the fact that present divergencies in theology find their source in this area—the grounds of authority; and the necessity of dependable foundations for the significant and powerful proclamation of the gospel today. That elements of personalistic idealism will be manifest in the solutions Dr. Harkness offers is suggested by her early reference to Edgar S. Brightman and Albert C. Knudson as those who laid the foundations of her mature thinking. This is duly borne out.

The volume begins with a chapter on the nature of authority in Christian belief. Indeed, Dr. Harkness is willing to describe her study by the title, Christian apologetics, since the latter "deals with the question of the nature

and validity of our knowledge of God" (11). The way in which this and other questions concerned with Christian truth should be dealt with will involve in part avoiding "the depreciation of reason as a guide to Christian truth" (20). Authority must not be conferred carelessly.

The opening chapter is followed by two chapters which relate theology to philosophy and the scientific method. With regard to the relation of philosophy and theology, the contributions of the former to the latter "appear primarily, on the one hand, as a spirit and mood; on the other, as epistemological method for the discovery of all knowledge including religious knowledge" (40). The spirit or mood of philosophy is one of "an open-minded search for truth" (41). And, whereas Christian knowledge may be "obligated to take its start from an inherited faith mediated through the Christian community and validated by personal Christian experience, it cannot stop there" (42). It must build upon the general presuppositions of all valid knowledge. Of these, there are seven.

It will be sufficient to mention the first and controlling consideration. "The primary criterion of truth is the coherence of all available evidence" (42). This is the appeal to systematic consistency: that position is to be accepted which is free from internal contradiction and is consistent with related available data. All truth-options must clear through the reason thus applied. This criterion of truth is the common requirement of a valid epistemology in any area of inquiry. The reviewer may comment at this point that without the immediate introduction of metaphysical implications, this criterion, as far as it goes epistemologically, appears satisfactory.

Descriptive science and philosophy have several points in common. Science and theology deal with the same world, though from different perspectives; but the latter should give no encouragement to the holding of a "double truth" viewpoint since it is always one world that is in question. And, both science and theology are in pursuit of truth, which is also one. Further, both disciplines are concerned to test their hypotheses for the purpose of verification.

Dr. Harkness insists, however, that theology must not dogmatically invade the legitimate area of science in the interest, for example, of defending the "literal infallibility of the Bible." She presupposes, of course, that the latter doctrine is incapable of defense in the light of undisputable scientific facts. Now the writer is willing to admit that should one deny the results of scientific investigation simply on the basis of its contradicting his theology, then he would be quite arbitrary. But in the instances cited, Dr. Harkness must be careful lest she accept the philosophical-theological interpretations of science (or better, of the philosophers of science) without questioning their metaphysical (and epistemological) orientation.

With the above as background and introduction, our author enters the positive development of her thesis. In the last four chapters of the book, she presents her evaluation of the four main sources of Christian knowledge: revelation, the Bible, the inner light, and the Christian community. These may all be summed up in Dr. Harkness' position that revelation does not give, *per se*, a body of revealed truth; rather it gives "an experience of God, mediated through the Christian community, which presents data to be examined by the canons of reason and the use of the coherence criterion. The result is Theology" (93). Jesus Christ is the supreme, the only adequate revelation of God — but, this is not to say that "in him is God's only revelation" (91). This position, she believes yields a dynamic synthesis of faith and reason. Thus, the "divine-human encounter" is basic: and if God is not found in this way, any other way is liable to be barren and unfruitful.

These are then the foundations of Christian knowledge for Georgia Harkness. How do they contrast with the historic Reformation position? In the first place, Dr. Harkness departs from this view in her acceptance of the results of higher criticism, or in her expression, historical science. The orthodox oppose this legitimate historical science, from her point of view, on dogmatic bases alone. On the other hand, we would assert that higher criticism applied to the Bible has operated with the metaphysical presuppositions of naturalism and the epistemological canons deducible from this metaphysic. Predictive prophecy, for example (and the supernatural in general), is thus read out of the Scripture as unhistorical. Whether this "unhistorical" data is viewed as beneath or beyond history does not make a great deal of difference — it did not *happen* in either case (and remember, Dr. Harkness would have us avoid any double-truth theory).

Even the Scripture the higher critic leaves does not function for our author as normative. It is simply the record of individual spiritual experience which we are to verify in our own lives and in the fellowship of the Christian community. Christian theology is thus ultimately never more than a speculative philosophy based on data interpretative of mystic experiences. Historic Christianity then is gone, and in its place we find a catalogue of human religious experiences (many of which are contradictory of each other) which at best can only yield unverifiable hypotheses. Consider the forgiveness of sins. Will God forgive us? Yes, Dr. Harkness would say, because so many religious people have experienced it (or at least claim so and it seems reasonable). But what about all the able and cultivated minds who do not have the experience and to whom it does not seem reasonable? Dr. Harkness has no historical revelation, in the classic Christian sense, with which to con-

front them. She has no multiplication of the miraculous surrounding a revelation once for all delivered within history unto the saints. Rather, all she has is a speculative philosophy (*demanded* by no particular set of data), different from Christianity in both form and content. Why then call it Christian?

—Lloyd F. Dean

## SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT ARTICLES

THOMAS H. LEITH

*Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation*, January. The text of all the papers given at the joint meeting of the Affiliation and the Evangelical Theological Society held at Winona Lake, Indiana last June. They deal with various aspects of the relation between science and the Bible.

*Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January. An issue dealing with Russia since Stalin—the old trends and the new problems. The November issue discusses at length "The Public School and Its Relation to the Community".

*American Scientist*, October, A. Grunbaum, "Time and Entropy"; K. Oakley, "Piltdown Man"; and H. Blum, "Perspectives in Evolution".

*Atlantic Monthly*, December, Donald Menzel, "How Long Will the World Last?" and Agnes and Ernest Hocking, "Creating a School" (a study of the parent-teacher experiment in Massachusetts' famous Sandy Hill School). The January issue contains articles by Vannevar Bush, "Can Men Live Without War?" and B. Ward, "Asia's Need and Western Policy".

*Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December, contains several articles on the genetic problems of nuclear weapons and radiation. The January number has an article by Hans Morgenthau, "Has Atomic War Really Become Impossible?" and one on "The Real Responsibility of the Scientist" by J. Bronowski.

*Bible Translator*, October, contains a list of commentaries on the Gospels and Acts.

*Bibliotheca Sacra*, October, Everett Harrison, "The Importance of the Septuagint for Biblical Studies (Part 1)".

*Calvin Forum*, November, C. Jaarsma, "Must We Rethink Christian Education?" (continued in December) and E. Y. Monsma, "Creation and Theistic Evolution". The January issue has an article by H. Kuiper, "Karl Barth on God's Decrees" and another by J. Plekker on the structure of the personality.

*Christian Scholar*, December, C. P. Shedd, "The Road Ahead for Religion in Higher Education" and H. Hofmann, "Theology and Depth Psychology".

*Comparative Literature*, Fall, H. Stammler, "Dostoevsky's Aesthetics and Schelling's Philosophy of Art".

*Confluence*, January. A series of articles on the relation of advanced to under-developed countries stressing problems of teaching technology and ideology.

*Current History*, December. Articles discussing American problems related to democracy and empire, colonial tendencies, statehood, and trusteeship. The January issue deals with the Soviet Union, in its many aspects, since Stalin.

*Diogenes*, Number 10, Jacques Rueff, "Order in Nature and Society"; Carl Friedrich, "Two Philosophical Interpretations of Natural Law"; and C. G. Bell, "Modern Poetry and the Pursuit of Sense". Issue Number 11 has an article by Rene Schaerer entitled "The Mythical Portrayal of Evil and the Fall of Man".

*Etc.*, Summer 1955, P. W. Bridgman, "Science and Common Sense" and E. C. Kelley, "Education is Communication".

*Etudes Philosophiques*, July-September, contains an article on Soviet psychology.

*Fact's Forum*, December, has three articles on Federal aid to public education. The January issue contains a series on the pro's and con's of Social Security and an article by Carl Henry on "Christianity and the Social Crisis". E. J. Pels writes on "Art For Whose Sake?" in the February number.

*Foreign Affairs*, January, P. H. Nitze, "Atoms, Strategy and Policy"; A. Bergson, "The Russian Economy Since Stalin"; and J. C. Campbell, "Negotiation with the Soviets: Some Lessons of the War Period".

*Harpers*, January, T. R. Waring, "The Southern Case Against Desegregation". In February Adlai Stevenson writes on the role of an opposition party. There is also a challenge by R. L. Bruckberger to American intellectuals to concern themselves with the problems of their fellows.

*Hibbert Journal*, January, F. W. Dillistone, "The Christian Doctrine of Man and Modern Psychological Theories"; P. Leon, "M. R. A.: A Contemporary Crux in the Philosophy and Application of Religion"; and B. Wooton, "The Ethics of the Wage Structure".

*Journal of Higher Education*, November, C. Davidson has an article on the application of industrial interpretations of efficient operation to colleges facing unprecedented enrollments. Also, E. Aubrey, "Religion in Public Higher Education" and H. Trowbridge, "The Colleges and Society". In the December number H. Wilson and G. Samson write on "The College Library and World Affairs" and there are two articles on colleges in a future of enlarged student bodies.

*His*, October. Classicist E. M. Blaiklock presents a fervent plea for Christian scholarship. In November, F. Schaeffer gives a Christian critique of modern art and in December, O. S. Walters discusses "Freud: His Philosophy of Life" and C. Applequist writes on jazz in the church. The January number has a survey of today's religious revival by J. T. Bayly and the February issue a symposium on divorce.

*International Affairs*, January, J. B. Brebner, "Tradition and Expediency in International Relations" and C. Issawi, "Economic and Social Foundations of Democracy in the Middle East".

*International Review of Missions*, January, W. R. Booth, "What is a Christian School?"

*Interpretation*, January. An issue dealing with the Incarnation.

*Isis*, December, contains a list of biographies from *Isis* and its European counterpart, *Osiris*, of historians and philosophers of Science.

*Journal of Philosophy*, November 10. A series of articles on ethical relativity in the light of recent developments in social science. There is a symposium on intention and interpretation in art in the issue of November 24. The issue of December 8 has an article by Paul F. Schmidt, "Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism" and that of January 19 a round table discussion in India and the U.S. on "Human Relations and International Obligations".

*Main Currents in Modern Thought*, the November and January issues contain an article by O. Tead, "Toward the Knowledge of Man—An Unorthodox Approach to College Studies".

*Nation*, December 10. Articles on American labor, its prospects and retrospect. The January 7 and 14 issues contain articles on religion on American college campuses.

*National Review*, January 25, Russell Kirk, "Mill's 'On Liberty' Reconsidered".

*Nature*, December 10, an editorial on higher technological education in Britain.

*Philosophical Quarterly*, January, P. Munz, "History and Myth" and A. Kolnai, "The Thematic Primacy of Moral Evil".

*Philosophical Review*, January, W. E. Kennick, "The Language of Religion".

*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, December. An article by Haig Khatchadourian criticizing Lecomte du Nouy's argument for teleology based on the improbability of life.

*Philosophy of Science*, October, J. Bucklew, "The Subjective Tradition in Phenomenological Psychology".

*Physics Today*, January, G. R. Harrison, the Dean of Science at M.I.T., discusses the responsibilities of the physicists for the future.

*Political Science Quarterly*, December, Yale Brozen, "Technological Change, Ideology and Productivity" and Loren Beth, "Toward a Modern American Theory of Church-State Relationships".

*Practical Anthropology*, December, Eugene Nida, "Identification, A Major Problem of Modern Missions".

*Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, January 17, an issue of studies on Benjamin Franklin.

*Quarterly Journal of Speech*. The October and December issues contain articles on communication theory and its psychological role by R. F. Hefferline. The October issue also has a paper by E. W. Harrington on "The Role of Speech in Liberal Education".

*Religious Education*, November-December. Contains a series of articles on "The Place of Religion in Training for Professions".

*Saturday Review*, January 7, Arnold Toynbee, "New Vistas for the Historian". January 1 issue contains a symposium on "Prosperity in the U.S.—Analysis and Forecast". "Mozart after 200 years" is the subject of a symposium on January 28. On February 4 there is an interesting article by F. G. Jennings on the current debate about the public school and its success in teaching reading.

*Scientific American*, December, J. Millot writes on the Coelacanth, the fossil fish of importance in evolutionary theory. The February number has I. C. Eiseley writing on Charles Darwin.

*Scientific Monthly*, January, P. F. Schmidt, "Some Merits and Misinterpretations of Scientific Method" and Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "A Biologist Looks at Human Nature".

*Sunday School Times*. The December 17 issue began a series on church history over the last 600 years. The writer is E. E. Cairns of Wheaton College.

*Teachers College Record*, December, M. Borrowman, "Liberalizing the Discipline of Education".

*Torch and Trumpet*, January, E. Heerma, "Toward a Christian Psychology" and an article defending state aid to Christian education. The November and December issues ran a series by P. E. Hughes on "Evolutionary Dogma and Christian Theology".

*Transactions of the Victoria Institute*, November 14, Erastus Evans, "The Figure of Christ in Jungian Psychology".

*Yale Review*, D. J. Dallin, "After Stalin" in the Winter issue.